Demystifying Hidden Sensitive Operations in Android Apps

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Résumé

Security of Android devices is now paramount, given their wide adoption among consumers. As researchers develop tools for statically or dynamically detecting suspicious apps, malware writers regularly update their attack mechanisms to hide malicious behavior implementation. This poses two problems to current research techniques: static analysis approaches, given their over-approximations, can report an overwhelming number of false alarms, while dynamic approaches will miss those behaviors that are hidden through evasion techniques. We propose in this work a static approach specifically targeted at highlighting hidden sensitive operations (HSOs), mainly sensitive data flows. The prototype version of HiSenDroid has been evaluated on a large-scale dataset of thousands of malware and goodware samples on which it successfully revealed anti-analysis code snippets aiming at evading detection by dynamic analysis. We further experimentally show that, with FlowDroid, some of the hidden sensitive behaviors would eventually lead to private data leaks. Those leaks would have been hard to spot either manually among the large number of false positives reported by the state-of-the-art static analyzers, or by dynamic tools. Overall, by putting the light on hidden sensitive operations, HiSenDroid helps security analysts in validating potentially sensitive data operations, which would be previously unnoticed.

Mots-clés

Computer science, Malware, Taint checking, Static analysis, False positive paradox, Android (operating system), Android malware, Computer security, Malware analysis, Information sensitivity, Evasion (ethics), System call, Machine learning, Software, Operating system, Programming language